





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 








On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida, 
No. 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF 
 
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE INTERNET ASSOCIATION 













November 15, 2021 
PATRICK J. CAROME 
ARI HOLTZBLATT 
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING 
    HALE AND DORR LLP 
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 663-6000 
 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
Internet Association 
 




CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS  
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Circuit  
Rule 26.1-1, the undersigned hereby certifies that Amicus Curiae Internet 
Association (“IA” or “Amicus”) is not a publicly held corporation, does not have a 
parent corporation, and has not issued stock.  Therefore, no publicly traded 
corporation owns ten percent or more of its stock.1 
Amicus also certifies, pursuant to Circuit Rule 26.1-2(b), that it is aware of no 
additional attorneys, persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, or 
corporations that have an interest in the outcome of this particular case on appeal 
other than those listed in the appellants’, appellees’, and other amici’s certificates. 
 
/s/ Patrick J. Carome  




1  Amicus further states, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, 
that none of the counsel for the parties in this litigation has authored this brief, in 
whole or in part.  Furthermore, no party, party’s counsel, or person—other than 
Amicus, its members, or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund 
preparing or submitting this brief.  All parties have consented to the filing of this 
brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2). 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 2 of 40 
 
- i - 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE .......................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................ 2 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 3 
 Congress Enacted Section 230 To Encourage Online Services To Self-
Regulate Content On Their Platforms ............................................................. 3 
A. Section 230’s Text, History, And Purpose Demonstrate That It 
Guarantees Online Services Broad Leeway To Moderate Content ...... 3 
B. Section 230 Is Accomplishing Congress’s Goal Of Encouraging 
Active And Diverse Content Moderation ............................................. 7 
 Section 230 Preempts State Laws Like S.B. 7072 That Prohibit, 
Discourage, Or Otherwise Interfere With Content Moderation .................... 10 
A. Longstanding Precedent Shows That S.B. 7072 Is Preempted ........... 10 
B. The State’s Arguments To The Contrary Are Unavailing .................. 17 
 S.B. 7072 Violates The First Amendment For Numerous Reasons, 
Including Because Online Services That Engage In Content 
Moderation Are Not Common Carriers ......................................................... 24 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 30 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 32 
 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 3 of 40 
 
- ii - 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Page(s) 
Arizona v. United States, 
567 U.S. 387 (2012) ............................................................................................ 18 
Attwood v. Clemons, 
526 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (N.D. Fla. 2021) ................................................................. 6 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................... 11, 12 
Bennett v. Google, LLC, 
882 F.3d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ................................................................ 6, 19, 24 
Boggs v. Boggs, 
520 U.S. 833 (1997) ............................................................................................ 10 
Dipp-Paz v. Facebook, 
2019 WL 3205842 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019) ..................................................... 19 
Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 
433 F. Supp. 3d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d on other grounds, 
2021 WL 4352312 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 2021) ....................................................... 24 
Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 
582 F. App’x 801 (11th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 11 
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 
934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ........................................................................... 14, 19 
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 
505 U.S. 88 (1992) ........................................................................................ 11, 24 
Green v. America Online (AOL), 
318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 12, 13 
Howard v. America Online, Inc., 
208 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 27 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 4 of 40 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
- iii - 
 
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ............................................................................. 7, 25 
Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 
2006 WL 3246596 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) .................................................... 27 
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 
753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 12 
Millan v. Facebook, Inc., 
2021 WL 1149937 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2021) (unpublished) ................ 27, 28 
Murphy v. Twitter, Inc., 
274 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) ........................................................ 12 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) ............................................. 4, 5 
United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460 (2010) ............................................................................................ 18 
Washington Post v. McManus, 
944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) .............................................................................. 26 
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 
2007 WL 5189857 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2007), aff’d, 568 F.3d 
1169 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................ 13 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) .................................................................... 7, 20, 25 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend. I ................................................................................ 3, 10, 25, 26 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
47 U.S.C.  
§ 153 .................................................................................................................... 27 
§ 223 .................................................................................................................... 27 
§ 230 .............................................................................................................passim 
 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 5 of 40 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
- iv - 
 
Fed. R. App. P.  
26.1 .................................................................................................................... C-1 
29(a)(2) ............................................................................................................. C-1 
32 ......................................................................................................................... 32 
 
Fla. Stat. 
§ 106.072(2) ........................................................................................................ 12 
§ 501.2041 ......................................................................................... 12, 13, 15, 19 
 
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) ................................................................................... 5 
S.B. 7072, 2021 Leg. (Fla. 2021) ......................................................................passim 
141 Cong. Rec. 21,999 (1995) ............................................................................... 5, 6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
About GAB.com, GAB, https://gab.com/about ........................................................ 10 
Alex Traub, Why Humans, Not Machines, Make the Tough Calls on 
Comments, N.Y. Times (Oct. 26, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/insider/why-humans-not-
machines-make-the-tough-calls-on-comments.html .......................................... 22 
An Update on Our Continuity Strategy During COVID-19, TWITTER 
(updated Apr. 1, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/ 
company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuity-strategy-during-
COVID-19 ........................................................................................................... 17 
Brian Dean, Reddit Usage and Growth Statistics, BACKLINKO, 
https://backlinko.com/reddit-users (updated Oct. 2021) .................................... 21 
Community Guidelines, PINTEREST, https://policy.pinterest.com/en/ 
community-guidelines .......................................................................................... 8 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 6 of 40 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
- v - 
 
Community Standards Enforcement Report-Q3 2021, Transparency 
Center, FACEBOOK (Nov. 2021), 
https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-
enforcement/ ....................................................................................................... 21 
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Broadening Our 
Guidance on Unverified Claims, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter. com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-
19.html#misleadinginformationupdate ............................................................... 17 
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, COVID-19 
Account Verification, TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/ company/2020/covid-
19.html#misleadinginformationupdate ............................................................... 17 
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Global 
Expansion of the COVID-19 Search Prompt, TWITTER (Mar. 4, 
2020), https://blog.twitter.com/ en_us/topics/company/ 
2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate ........................................... 17 
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Launch of a New 
Dedicated #KnowTheFacts Search Prompt, TWITTER (Jan. 29, 
2020), https://blog. twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-
19#misleadinginformationupdate ....................................................................... 17 
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Updating Our 
Approach to Misleading Information, TWITTER (May 11, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter.com/ en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-
19.html#misleadinginformationupdate ............................................................... 18 
Dating Safety Tips, CHRISTIAN MINGLE, 
https://about.christianmingle.com/en/safety-en/ ................................................... 9 
Do Not Post Violent Content, Account and Community Restrictions, 
REDDIT, https://www.reddithelp.com/en/categories/rules-
reporting/account-and-community-restrictions/do-not-post-violent-
content (last updated Sept. 2021) .......................................................................... 9 
GETTR, https://www.gettr.com/onboarding ........................................................... 10 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 7 of 40 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
- vi - 
 
Housing Data, Inventory, ZILLOW (Jan. 31-2018-Sept. 30, 2020), 
https://www.zillow.com/ research/data/How does Vimeo define 
hateful, harassing, defamatory, and discriminatory content? 
VIMEO, https://vimeo.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/224978328-
How-does-Vimeo-define-hateful-harassing-defamatory-and-
discriminatory-content- ....................................................................................... 21 
How does Vimeo define hateful, harassing, defamatory, and 
discriminatory content? VIMEO, 
https://vimeo.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/224978328-How-
does-Vimeo-define-hateful-harassing-defamatory-and-
discriminatory-content- ................................................................................... 9, 10 
Jeff Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary 
Immunity, 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 123 (Dec. 2010) ........................................ 8, 11 
Marina Pasquali, Number of Active Etsy Sellers from 2012 to 2020, 
STATISTA (July 7, 2021), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/409374/etsy-active-sellers/ ......................... 21 
Reddit Transparency Report 2020, REDDIT, 
https://www.redditinc.com/ policies/transparency-report-2020 ........................... 9 
Terms of Use, GETTR, https://www.gettr.com/terms (last updated 
Sept. 25, 2021) .................................................................................................... 10 
Tracy McGraw, Spending 2020 Together on Twitter, Insights, 
TWITTER, https://blog.twitter. 
com/en_us/topics/insights/2020/spending-2020-together-on-twitter 
(Dec. 7, 2020) ..................................................................................................... 21  
Website Terms of Service, GAB, https://gab.com/about/tos (last 
updated Apr. 10, 2020) ....................................................................................... 10 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 8 of 40 
 
- 1 - 
 
IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Internet Association (“IA” or “Amicus”) represents the interests of a broad 
array of internet companies and their customers, advocating for protecting internet 
freedom and free speech, promoting innovation and economic growth, and 
empowering customers and users.2  Given this focus and IA’s diverse membership 
of the world’s leading internet companies, IA offers distinct information and 
perspective concerning the issues in this litigation.  Indeed, IA member platforms 
host billions of pieces of new content every day, using a variety of techniques—
including human review and machine learning—to evaluate posts, images, videos, 
and other content, and restrict access to content that violates their community 
standards.  IA and its members thus have a deep knowledge of content moderation 
and its challenges.  Based in part on that expertise, courts have permitted IA to file 
amicus briefs in many other cases that touch on these issues, see, e.g., Domen v. 
Vimeo, Inc., No. 20-616 (2d. Cir. Aug. 7, 2021), ECF No. 75, including in the district 
court in this case, see ECF No. 77.  
Amicus’s members also have a substantial interest in this case because S.B. 
7072 attempts to dictate how they shall (or shall not) moderate third-party content 
on their online platforms.  Many of IA’s members would likely qualify as “social 
 
2  A complete list of Internet Association members is available at 
http://internetassociation.org/our-members/. 
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media platforms” under S.B. 7072.  S.B. 7072 thus threatens those members’ ability 
to adopt, adapt, and enforce editorial and curatorial standards intended to reflect and 
promote the diverse views of each individual platform and the community it serves.  
Content moderation is essential to the operations and expression of Amicus’s 
members; indeed, the success and identities of these online businesses—to say 
nothing of the vitality of online media generally—depends on their ability to 
moderate content quickly and efficiently without exposure to the burdens, chilling 
of expression, and uncertainty posed by state laws that interfere with that process 
and potentially subject them to investigations, sanctions, and lawsuits. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
S.B. 7072 should be enjoined on numerous grounds, most notably because it 
violates the First Amendment.  While this brief touches upon that constitutional 
infirmity, it principally focuses on why Section 230 of the federal Communications 
Decency Act independently requires affirmance.   
For more than two decades, Section 230 has formed the foundation for the 
modern internet by protecting the rights of online platforms, not the government, to 
choose what content they disseminate.  As discussed in Parts I and II below, Section 
230’s text, history, and purpose—reinforced by an unbroken line of court 
decisions—all make clear that this system of self-regulation was the law’s intended 
result.  Every aspect of S.B. 7072 flies in the face of those protections because it 
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seeks to replace the discretion guaranteed by Section 230 with one State’s vision of 
what material should be permitted online.  Such interference with federal law is 
plainly preempted.   
Even if S.B. 7072 were not preempted, the First Amendment independently 
bars its assault on the protected editorial discretion that underlies content 
moderation.  The State and its amici’s arguments to the contrary are meritless.  In 
particular, as discussed in Part III below, their erroneous contention that online 
platforms are common carriers is refuted by Section 230. 
The district court’s preliminary injunction should be affirmed for these 
reasons, in addition to those given in NetChoice’s brief.      
ARGUMENT 
 CONGRESS ENACTED SECTION 230 TO ENCOURAGE ONLINE SERVICES TO 
SELF-REGULATE CONTENT ON THEIR PLATFORMS  
A. Section 230’s Text, History, And Purpose Demonstrate That It 
Guarantees Online Services Broad Leeway To Moderate Content 
The text of Section 230 grants online services substantial discretion to 
moderate content.  The statute explicitly aims to empower platforms to develop their 
own community standards for content on their platforms and to make their own 
independent decisions regarding how to enforce those standards.  In particular, 
Section 230 broadly protects platforms from litigation and liability related to 
publishing third-party content, see 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1), as well as “any action 
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the 
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provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected,” id. §230(c)(2)(A).   
The history and purpose of Section 230 confirm that the statute both prohibits 
restrictions on content moderation and was enacted to promote active and 
discretionary self-regulation.  Section 230 was passed in response to Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995).  Prodigy operated an online bulletin board service with two million users and 
held itself out as operating a “family oriented” website.  Id. at *2-3.  In pursuit of 
that goal, the company issued “content guidelines” and used screening software to 
remove offensive or objectionable content.  Id.  But Prodigy’s efforts backfired; the 
New York court ruled that Prodigy could be liable for third-party content on its 
bulletin boards because, rather than allowing all messages, Prodigy had made 
“decisions as to content” by “actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete 
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and bad taste.”  
Id. at *4 (citations and quotations omitted).   
Congress enacted Section 230 the following year to reject the “massive 
disincentive” that Stratton had created for online providers to self-regulate content 
on their platforms.  141 Cong. Rec. 21,999, 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  
The Conference Report for the statute explained that “[o]ne of [its] specific 
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purposes” was to overrule Stratton and instead protect providers from liability for 
“restrict[ing] access to objectionable material,” even if, like Prodigy, they do not 
manage to remove all of it.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  
Section 230’s legislative history likewise reflects that Congress intended to 
encourage voluntary content moderation and prevent government interference with 
such decisions.  A cosponsor explained that Section 230 sought to “help … along” 
“the opportunity for education and political discourse that [the internet] offers” by 
taking the “Government … out of the way and let[ting] parents and individuals 
control it rather than Government doing that job for us.”  141 Cong. Rec. at 22,045 
(statement of Rep. Cox).  Said otherwise, Congress did not want an “army of 
bureaucrats regulating the Internet.”  Id.  Another cosponsor explained that platforms 
could not possibly “take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be 
coming into them from all manner of sources….  [T]hat is going to be thousands of 
pages of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is 
wrong.”  141 Cong. Rec. at 22,046 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).  
Section 230’s findings, policy pronouncements, and structure reflect 
Congress’s intent to prohibit restrictions on content moderation and encourage self-
regulation.  The statute provides “[p]rotection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”  47 U.S.C. §230(c).  Indeed, the entire provision is 
titled, “Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.”  Id. 
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§230 (emphasis added).  The statute also sets forth Congress’s finding that “the 
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all 
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.”  Id. §230(a)(4).  Congress 
explained that “[i]t is the policy of the United States ... to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  Id. §230(b)(2).  
Congress further stated that it enacted Section 230 “to remove disincentives for the 
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower 
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material.”  Id. §230(b)(4).  And it similarly expressed that the statute was meant “to 
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet.”  
Id. §230(b)(3).   
Unsurprisingly, then, courts have recognized that Congress enacted Section 
230 to “‘encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive 
material over their services.’”  Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1164 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) (emphasis added); see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Congress sought to encourage websites to make efforts 
to screen content without fear of liability.”); Attwood v. Clemons, 526 F. Supp. 3d 
1152, 1170 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (“Congress has chosen to allow private companies and 
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private users to censor.”).  Indeed, Congress worried that without Section 230, 
providers might “abstain from self-regulation” entirely.  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).   
B. Section 230 Is Accomplishing Congress’s Goal Of Encouraging 
Active And Diverse Content Moderation 
The growth of internet platforms that cater to diverse communities and 
employ varied moderation practices show that Section 230 is serving its intended 
purpose.  Many platforms voluntarily engage in socially beneficial content 
moderation.  See Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary 
Immunity, 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 123, 154-55 (Dec. 2010).  And by allowing 
platforms to self-police rather than having the government set their standards, 
platforms with different values and user bases may express themselves through 
distinct content-moderation approaches specifically tailored to the diverse needs of 
the communities they seek to foster.  That results in a marketplace that allows people 
to choose among platforms with different content-moderation practices and 
identities that cater to different audiences.  Id. at 153-155.   
IA member Pinterest, for example, is an image-sharing and social media 
company that expresses its community values by prohibiting “antagonistic, explicit, 
false or misleading, harmful, hateful, or violent content or behavior” in order to serve 
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its mission of “bring[ing] everyone the inspiration to create a life they love.”3  By 
contrast, IA member Reddit’s decentralized, community-based moderation system 
is intended to empower the site’s users themselves—“akin to a democracy, wherein 
everyone has the ability to vote and self-organize, follow a set of common rules, 
establish community-specific norms, and ultimately share some responsibility for 
how the platform works.”4  And while online providers that (like Prodigy) seek to 
create “family-oriented” platforms may broadly prohibit violent or graphic content, 
others may allow such content in particular contexts, such as for “educational, 
newsworthy, artistic, satire” or “documentary” purposes, or may require users 
posting such content to self-identify it so others can easily avoid it.5   
Still other platforms may adopt moderation practices based on their particular 
value systems.  Religious dating sites, for example, may have posting guidelines 
reflecting their commitment to the communities they seek to support and serve, such 
as Christian Mingle, which promotes a style of user interactions designed to create 
3 Community Guidelines, PINTEREST, https://policy.pinterest.com/en/
community-guidelines.  All websites in this brief were last visited on November 15, 
2021.   
4 Reddit Transparency Report 2020, REDDIT, https://www.redditinc.com/
policies/transparency-report-2020. 
5 E.g., Do Not Post Violent Content, Account and Community Restrictions,
REDDIT, https://www.reddithelp.com/en/categories/rules-reporting/account-and-
community-restrictions/do-not-post-violent-content. 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 16 of 40 
 
- 9 - 
 
“meaningful, long-lasting relationship[s]” and “Christian dating happiness.”6  Even 
platforms with more generalist audiences may adopt content-moderation policies 
that express specific values, like Vimeo, which prohibits “content that displays a 
demeaning attitude toward specific groups, including … [v]ideos that promote 
Sexual Orientation Change Efforts.”7  And some websites may choose moderation 
practices reflecting particular political outlooks.  For instance, Gab—a social media 
website that offers what it considers “a fresh take on … social networking” and 
“strives to be the home of free speech online”8—chooses to avoid “proscrib[ing] 
offensive speech” and broadly allows “written expression that is protected political, 
religious, symbolic, or commercial speech under the First Amendment” with limited 
exceptions.9  Meanwhile GETTR, which describes itself as “founded on the 
principles of free speech, independent thought and rejecting political censorship and 
‘cancel culture,’”10 seeks to protect users from harmful or “otherwise objectionable 
 
6  Dating Safety Tips, CHRISTIAN MINGLE, https://about.christianmingle.
com/en/safety-en/.  
7  How does Vimeo define hateful, harassing, defamatory, and discriminatory 
content? VIMEO, https://vimeo.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/224978328-How-
does-Vimeo-define-hateful-harassing-defamatory-and-discriminatory-content-. 
8  About, GAB, https://gab.com/about.  
9  Website Terms of Service, GAB, https://gab.com/about/tos.  
10  GETTR, https://www.gettr.com/onboarding. 
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or inappropriate” content by reserving the right, “in its sole discretion,” to “reject, 
delete, move, re-format, remove, or refuse to post” user content.11   
The freedom of platforms to choose, develop, and follow varying community 
standards and moderation practices is essential to offering secure, desirable, and 
functional services that express the values of the platforms and their intended 
participants and audiences.  Under this free-market approach to content moderation, 
platforms “seek to please their customers” and therefore “are more likely than courts 
to develop content standards that conform to basic community values.”  Kosseff, 15 
J. Tech. L. & Pol’y at 153.   
 SECTION 230 PREEMPTS STATE LAWS LIKE S.B. 7072 THAT PROHIBIT, 
DISCOURAGE, OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH CONTENT MODERATION 
A. Longstanding Precedent Shows That S.B. 7072 Is Preempted 
Congress expressly preempted all state laws that, like S.B. 7072, are 
“inconsistent” with Section 230.  47 U.S.C. §230(e)(3).  S.B. 7072 is also implicitly 
preempted because it is fundamentally “[in]consistent with the structure and 
purpose” of Section 230.  Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 
98 (1992) (O’Connor, J., plurality op.); accord Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 
(1997).  Specifically, subsections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2)—which respectively bar 
“treat[ing]” platforms as “publishers” of third-party content and holding platforms 
 
11  Terms of Use, GETTR, https://www.gettr.com/terms.  
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liable “on account of” “voluntar[y],” “good faith” actions “to restrict access to or 
availability of material” that they “consider to be ... objectionable” (even if the 
content is “constitutionally protected”)—operate in tandem to shield platforms from 
liability for decisions concerning what content to publish and what content to block 
or suppress.    
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 
(9th Cir. 2009), subsection 230(c)(1) “shields from liability all publication decisions, 
whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to content generated entirely by 
third parties.”  This Court and others have similarly recognized that subsection 
230(c)(1) protects online service providers’ decisions about what content to publish 
on their platforms.  See Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 F. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 
2014).  In Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), for 
instance, the D.C. Circuit held that Facebook could not be held liable for “allowing 
[objectionable] pages to exist on its website” and then belatedly removing those 
pages, explaining that “the very essence of publishing is making the decision 
whether to print or retract a given piece of content.”  And in Murphy v. Twitter, Inc., 
274 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021), the California Court of Appeal 
likewise recognized that subsection 230(c)(1) protects platforms’ editorial decisions, 
specifically holding that the subsection preempted state-law claims challenging 
Twitter’s enforcement of its rule against “messages critical of transgender women.”   
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Subsection 230(c)(2)(A) complements the “publisher” protection granted in 
subsection 230(c)(1).12  It allows online providers to establish “standards of decency 
without risking liability for doing so.”  Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 
472 (3d Cir. 2003).  But given the wide range of platforms on the internet, there can 
be no one objective “standard[] of decency.”  Id.  Accordingly, “Section 
230(c)(2)(A) … does not require that the material actually be objectionable; rather, 
it affords protection for blocking material ‘that the provider or user considers to be’ 
objectionable.”  Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 2007 WL 5189857, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 28, 2007), aff’d, 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009). 
This consistent line of decisions applying subsections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) 
clearly precludes laws, such as S.B. 7072, that purport to regulate, and impose 
liability based upon, platforms’ decisions about what third-party content to publish, 
suppress, or remove.  S.B. 7072 would impose liability on an online platform for, 
among other things, (1) deplatforming, post-prioritizing, or shadow banning political 
candidates or content about such candidates, §§106.072(2), 501.2041(2)(h); 
 
12  Although complementary, subsection 230(c)(2) “provides an additional shield 
from liability” in circumstances where subsection 230(c)(1) might not apply—for 
example, where a service provider “developed, even in part, the content at issue” or 
took action that did not involve “publishing or speaking, but rather … restrict[ing] 
access to obscene or otherwise objectionable content” in some other way.  Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1105.  The State is thus wrong that applying subsection 230(c)(1) to 
providers’ decisions to remove or screen content would render subsection 230(c)(2) 
superfluous.  See State Br. 18.   
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(2) censoring, deplatforming, or shadow banning a “journalistic enterprise” or its 
content, §501.2041(1)(d), (2)(j); (3) failing to “apply censorship, deplatforming, and 
shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its users on the platform,” 
§501.2041(2)(b); and (4) changing their “user rules, terms, and agreements ... more 
than once every 30 days,” §501.2041(2)(c).  These provisions (and others) are 
preempted because each interferes with platforms’ discretion under subsections 
230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) to publish or moderate content based on whether the 
provider believes the content objectionable.  
Start with the prohibitions on post-prioritization, shadow banning, and 
inconsistent content moderation, which all run afoul of subsection 230(c)(1) by 
imposing liability based on a platform’s publishing decisions.  S.B. 7072 defines 
“post-prioritization” as “action … to place, feature, or prioritize certain content or 
material ahead of, below, or in a more or less prominent position than others in a 
newsfeed, a feed, a view, or in search results.”  §501.2041(1)(e).  And the law defines 
“shadow ban[ning]” as “limit[ing] or eliminat[ing] the exposure of a user or content 
or material posted by a user to other users of the social media platform.”  
§501.2041(1)(f).  Each of these prohibitions, along with the consistency 
requirement, necessarily impose liability based on a platform’s decision to publish, 
or prioritize, some content but not others.   
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To illustrate, consider a situation in which Carrol’s post is removed for 
violating a platform’s community standards, but Dana’s seemingly identical post is 
left untouched.  If Carrol sues the platform based on that “inconsistent” treatment, 
she would necessarily be attempting to impose liability for the platform not 
removing—i.e., publishing—Dana’s post.  Likewise, if Carrol sued because some 
posts from Dana and many other users were prioritized over hers, or because relative 
to Dana’s posts Carrol’s posts had been “shadow banned,” such a claim would 
necessarily turn on the platform’s having disseminated—i.e., published—Dana’s 
and those other users’ posts more prominently.  Such claims run afoul of subsection 
230(c)(1) by “treat[ing]” the platform as a “publisher” of third-party content.  See 
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 71 (2d Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument “that 
Facebook should not be afforded Section 230[(c)(1)] immunity because Facebook 
has chosen to undertake efforts to eliminate objectionable and dangerous content but 
has not been effective or consistent in those efforts”).   
These moderation activities—along with decisions to deplatform or “censor” 
certain entities or individuals—are also protected by subsection 230(c)(2)(A).  
Returning to our hypothetical users, the platform removed Carrol’s post because the 
platform determined that it violated the platform’s community standards or was 
otherwise objectionable.  Subsection 230(c)(2)(A) plainly protects a platform from 
liability for such good faith efforts to moderate objectionable content.  A platform 
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would likewise be protected in prioritizing content it considers to be non-
objectionable (“post-prioritization”) or limiting the exposure of content it deems 
objectionable (“shadow banning”)—in other words, for its actions “to restrict access 
to or availability of material” that the platform in “good faith” considers to be 
“objectionable.”  47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2)(A).   
This stylized example demonstrates how Section 230’s components work 
together to immunize online service providers for content-moderation efforts, which 
inevitably involve decisions both to publish and remove (or prioritize or de-
prioritize) content.  More importantly, Carrol and Dana’s situation demonstrates that 
both subsections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) operate to preempt, in every possible 
application, S.B. 7072’s limits on providers’ discretion to publish or moderate 
content.   
S.B. 7072’s prohibition against platforms changing their “user rules, terms, 
and agreements ... more than once every 30 days,” §501.2041(2)(c), also invariably 
conflicts with the protections subsections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) afford by severely 
hindering platforms’ ability to adapt to new circumstances that may rapidly emerge 
on the internet.  Platforms must act nimbly to adapt their policies and respond to 
developments in this highly dynamic space.  These sorts of quickly evolving 
moderation practices—which are employed to combat a variety of threats, from 
violence against ethnic minorities to vaccine misinformation—would be impossible 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 23 of 40 
 
- 16 - 
 
under laws constraining the frequency with which platforms may change their 
policies or practices.  Yet under S.B. 7072, each and every change would restart an 
arbitrary 30-day clock, freezing the then-extant set of policies in place.  And as this 
problematic 30-day cycle repeats itself, platforms would forever be left at least a 
step behind, prohibited from protecting their users and the public. 
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic well-demonstrates the need for rapid 
adjustments to content-moderation policies and practices.  IA member Twitter, for 
example, implemented a policy on COVID-19 misinformation soon after the 
pandemic began, launching a search prompt that ensured users seeking information 
about COVID-19 were “met with credible, authoritative information first.”13  Within 
months, it expanded that search prompt globally.14  Less than two weeks later, 
Twitter announced new enforcement guidance, broadening its definition of harm to 
address COVID-19 misinformation.15  Days afterward, it announced that it had 
 
13  Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Launch of a New 
Dedicated #KnowTheFacts Search Prompt, TWITTER (Jan. 29, 2020), https://blog.
twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19#misleadinginformationupdate. 
14  Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Global Expansion of the 
COVID-19 Search Prompt, TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/ 2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate. 
15  An Update on Our Continuity Strategy During COVID-19, TWITTER (Mar. 
16, 2020; updated Apr. 1, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/
2020/An-update-on-our-continuity-strategy-during-COVID-19. 
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begun to verify accounts that provided credible COVID-19 updates.16  Such iterative 
changes continued over the next several months, including a prohibition on 
“unverified claims [related to COVID-19] that have the potential to incite people to 
action”17 and “new labels and warning messages that will provide additional context 
and information on some Tweets containing disputed or misleading information 
related to COVID-19.”18  Section 230 protects this ability to make editorial and 
moderation decisions that a platform, like Twitter, considers necessary to address or 
respond to current events.   
B. The State’s Arguments To The Contrary Are Unavailing  
The State’s primary response to these clear and many-faceted conflicts with 
Section 230 is to argue that there are some circumstances where S.B. 7072 could be 
applied consistently with federal law, such that S.B. 7072 is not facially preempted.  
But the State misconstrues the test for a facial challenge, claiming incorrectly that 
there must be “‘no set of circumstances … under which the [state statute] would be 
 
16  Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, COVID-19 Account 
Verification, TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate. 
17  Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Broadening Our 
Guidance on Unverified Claims, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2020), https://blog.twitter.
com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate. 
18  Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Updating Our Approach 
to Misleading Information, TWITTER (May 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate. 
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valid.’”  State Br. 10.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, a state law need not be 
preempted in every conceivable circumstance to be facially preempted.  See Arizona 
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012) (holding state immigration law “creates 
an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress … [and] is preempted by 
federal law” even though the state law could be applied consistently with federal law 
in certain circumstances).  Instead, the Supreme Court has held that a law may be 
facially invalid where “‘a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional.’”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010).  For the 
reasons already explained, this is plainly the case for S.B. 7072. 
But the State’s arguments fall short even under its own (erroneous) standard.  
As illustrated above, application of any of the provisions of S.B. 7072 necessarily 
conflicts with Section 230—generally twice over, running into both subsection 
230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2)(A).  The State’s more specific arguments fare no better.  
“[M]ost important[ly],” the State contends that certain applications of S.B. 7072 are 
permissible because subsection 230(c)(2) requires a provider to moderate content in 
“good faith.”  See State Br. 13-14.  As an initial matter, subsection 230(c)(1) does 
not contain a good faith requirement and thus preempts S.B. 7072’s attempt to 
regulate providers’ editorial decisions regardless of the state statute’s interaction 
with subsection 230(c)(2).  And more to the point, S.B. 7072 itself does not include 
a “good faith” exception.  Instead, it facially prohibits, for example, all 
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“inconsistent” platform moderation.  §501.2041(2)(b).  As the district court correctly 
recognized, “[g]ood faith, for this purpose, is determined by federal law, not state 
law”—meaning that the State (and state courts) cannot impose their own 
idiosyncratic view as to what counts as bad faith.  App.1710.  S.B. 7072’s text thus 
demonstrates that there is no circumstance in which it can be applied consistent with 
Section 230.   
The State also errs in arguing that requiring consistency is not the same as 
“regulat[ing] content moderation.”  State Br. 14-15.  That is nonsensical.  To start, 
it disregards that Congress enacted Section 230 specifically to protect providers who 
“remove[] some—but not all—offensive material from their websites.”  Bennett, 882 
F.3d at 1166.  S.B. 7072 directly contradicts that congressional mandate by imposing 
liability for decisions to remove or restrict some but not other content.  In other 
words, Section 230’s protections apply where a provider “undertake[s] efforts to 
eliminate objectionable” content, even where it “has not been effective or consistent 
in those efforts.”  Force, 934 F.3d at 71 (emphasis added).19   
More fundamentally, the State’s argument ignores the realities of the internet, 
which preclude the absolute consistency in content moderation that S.B. 7072 tries 
 
19  The State likewise errs in arguing (State Br. 15) that “deplatforming” is not 
“action … to restrict access to or availability of material”—as suspending or deleting 
a user’s account necessarily restricts access to content posted by that user.  See Dipp-
Paz v. Facebook, 2019 WL 3205842, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019). 
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to mandate.  In enacting Section 230, Congress recognized that it would be 
“impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for 
possible problems,” given the already “staggering” amount of information generated 
and communicated by users.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.  Yet those “millions of 
postings” from when the statute was enacted have now skyrocketed into the billions.  
For example, last year Twitter hosted more than 700 million Tweets about elections; 
more than 2 billion Tweets about sports, and more than 7,000 Tweets per minute 
about television and movies.20  Even on “smaller” platforms, the amount of user-
generated content is still staggering; for example, the real estate website Zillow 
featured 1,103,657 active listings as of September 30, 2021,21 the independent seller 
platform Etsy hosted more than 4.3 million sellers in 2020,22 and Reddit has 52 
million daily active users.23  And although the relative portion of potentially violative 
or objectionable content is small, in absolute numbers it is very large.  In the third 
quarter of 2021, for instance, Facebook took action on 9.2 million pieces of content 
 
20  McGraw, Spending 2020 Together on Twitter, Insights, TWITTER (Dec. 7, 
2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/insights/2020/spending-2020-together-
on-twitter. 
21  See Housing Data, Inventory, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/research/
data/ (inventory Excel linked for download). 
22  Pasquali, Number of Active Etsy Sellers from 2012 to 2020, STATISTA (July 
7, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/409374/etsy-active-sellers/. 
23  Dean, Reddit Usage and Growth Statistics, BACKLINKO (Oct. 12, 2021), 
https://backlinko.com/reddit-users. 
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for bullying and harassment, 1.8 million pieces of content for child nudity and 
physical abuse, 9.8 million pieces of content for terrorism, 2 million pieces of 
content for organized hate, and 1.8 billion fake accounts.24   
Considered against the vast volumes of content and numbers of users on 
today’s internet, there is simply no way for a platform to review every one of these 
posts to ensure consistent application of its rules or standards, or to establish 
standards that anticipate every possible type of objectionable content that any 
random user, among its millions or billions, might invent.  Even when users or 
technology flag possible community standards violations, and even when platforms 
have clear training on the standards’ implementation, moderation decisions are often 
still subject to the inevitable fallibility and/or inconsistencies of human reviewers or 
automated review mechanisms.25  And because no one person could possibly review 
every content violation, and different people may apply the same standard 
differently, there are bound to be different moderation decisions.  The only way to 
avoid those moderation shortfalls—and engage in “consistent” moderation—would 
 
24  Community Standards Enforcement Report, Transparency Center, 
FACEBOOK (Nov. 2021), https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-
enforcement/. 
25  See Traub, Why Humans, Not Machines, Make the Tough Calls on Comments, 
N.Y. Times (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/insider/why-
humans-not-machines-make-the-tough-calls-on-comments.html (describing the 
New York Times’ partially automated moderation practices).   
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be to eschew moderation altogether.  A “consistency” requirement would thus bar 
most, if not all, efforts to enforce community standards on a provider’s service.  
Upholding S.B. 7072’s “consistency” requirement would also (ironically) 
permit a patchwork of inconsistent regulatory regimes.  Under the State’s reading of 
Section 230’s preemptive sweep, any state could follow Florida’s lead and impose 
its own view of what should or should not appear online.  Consider, for example, a 
state that passes a law encouraging online platforms to restrict access to posts 
contravening FDA vaccine guidance.  Or even a state law that prohibits “inconsistent 
moderation” with a different definition of consistency.  Compliance with such 
provisions might well run afoul of S.B. 7072, putting an online platform in an 
impossible position. 
Yet another problem with S.B. 7072’s demand for “consistent” content 
moderation is that, at least in this context, what qualifies as “consistent” is highly 
nebulous.  The Florida legislature did not even attempt to define the term.  Must a 
platform take precisely the same enforcement action against users who publish the 
exact same content or category of content, does a sliding scale apply, or is there some 
other measure of consistency?  However the term “consistent” might be interpreted, 
it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to apply any rule of consistency to 
activities and decisions that are as varied and subjective as moderating and curating 
the unimaginably diverse types of third-party content that are constantly being 
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posted through online platforms with the relentlessness of countless firehoses.  
Because context matters, and something that is offensive or hateful in one setting 
may be empowering or educational in another, any attempt to moderate has the 
potential to be deemed “inconsistent.”  So rather than encouraging varied approaches 
to content moderation, S.B. 7072 would effectively mandate a uniform approach to 
content moderation: none.  That outcome is entirely inconsistent with Section 230’s 
text and “‘object and policy,’” and S.B. 7072 is therefore preempted.  Gade, 505 
U.S. at 98 (O’Connor, J., plurality op.).  
Finally, the State argues that the term “otherwise objectionable” in Section 
230 does not apply to viewpoint-based moderation.  See State Br. 15-16.  That 
assertion lacks any support in the statute or caselaw interpreting Section 230.  
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the subjective standard of “objectionableness” that 
Section 230 expressly prescribes.  As numerous courts have recognized, Section 230 
encourages providers to moderate content that they consider objectionable.  E.g., 
Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d on other 
grounds, 2021 WL 4352312 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 2021); see also supra p.12.  That 
subjective standard furthers Congress’s desired hands-off approach and allows 
providers—not the government—to determine what content is permitted on their 
platforms based on the needs of the online community they seek to foster.  That 
decision-making process necessarily is based on the provider’s viewpoint of what 
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constitutes hateful, abusive, or otherwise objectionable content.  Prohibiting 
providers from making these sorts of editorial decisions would conflict with the 
broad discretion afforded by Section 230.   
In sum, in enacting Section 230, Congress sought to avoid the “‘obvious 
chilling effect’” from “holding website operators liable for [third-party] content,” 
while simultaneously “encourag[ing] websites to make efforts to screen content 
without fear of liability.”  Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 19.  Section 230’s broad 
protections have served as foundations for the development and growth of the 
internet as a medium for free expression and commerce, see Bennett, 882 F.3d at 
1166, and this Court should not permit the State to undermine them.  
 S.B. 7072 VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR NUMEROUS REASONS, 
INCLUDING BECAUSE ONLINE SERVICES THAT ENGAGE IN CONTENT 
MODERATION ARE NOT COMMON CARRIERS 
For the reasons given in NetChoice’s brief (at 22-50), the district court also 
correctly concluded that Plaintiffs are overwhelmingly likely to succeed on their 
First Amendment challenges to S.B. 7072.  See APP1718-1723.  The content-
moderation decisions and community standards that S.B. 7072 targets are protected, 
expressive choices about the content that online platforms wish to disseminate, 
restrict, or block.  Indeed, as described above, the experiences of IA’s own members 
demonstrate how content-moderation policies are used to shape online communities.  
See supra pp.7-10.  And there are many other ways in which social media platforms 
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might express their views through content moderation.  A political party could create 
a platform for grassroots organizing, employing content moderation to promote the 
ability of itself and its users to develop a community interested in achieving the same 
policy goals.  A church might use a social media site to connect members of its faith, 
yet decide that creating a space for spiritual growth requires excluding posts 
attacking tenants of the faith.  Such decisions are both necessary to create vibrant 
online communities and indistinguishable from those made by a parade organizer, a 
bookstore owner, or a newspaper editor.  The First Amendment thus precludes S.B. 
7072’s effort to “force[] [online platforms] to speak in a way they would not 
otherwise.”  Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 518 (4th Cir. 2019). 
One of the several—and meritless—ways that the State and its amici try to 
avoid this body of precedent is to argue that the online platforms S.B. 7072 would 
regulate are common carriers.  See, e.g., State Br. 34-39; Babylon Bee Br. 20-26; 
Institute for Free Speech Br. 2, 10-11.  Indeed, some go so far as to make the absurd 
assertion that Section 230 itself confirms that status.  See State Br. 38; see also 
Babylon Bee Br. 26.  According to them, this supposed common-carrier status 
waters-down the First Amendment protections that the targeted platforms enjoy.  For 
the reasons given in NetChoice’s brief (at 38-42), this is nonsense.  In particular, as 
the present brief now elaborates, every aspect of Section 230, to say nothing of the 
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reality of how social media functions, confirms that the platforms at issue here are 
not common carriers.    
First, Section 230 was enacted as part of the Telecommunication Act of 1996, 
which expressly recognizes that “interactive computer services”—the very category 
of services that Section 230 defines for purposes of establishing who it protects, see 
47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2)—are not common carriers.  The Telecommunication Act 
distinguishes between regulated providers that are common carriers and those that 
are not, and imposes certain obligations only on the former.  See, e.g., Sec. 3(a)(49) 
(“A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this 
Act[.]”) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §153).  Most importantly, the Act then expressly 
states that it does not impose common-carrier obligations on “interactive computer 
services.”  See Sec. 502 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to treat 
interactive computer services as common carriers or telecommunications carriers.”) 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §223); see also id. (“The use of the term ‘telecommunications 
device’ in this section … does not include an interactive computer service.”).  
Against this regulatory backdrop, courts have repeatedly held that online platforms, 
including ones that S.B. 7072 targets, are not common carriers under federal law.  
See, e.g., Howard v. America Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 753 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding AOL is not a “common carrier”); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 
2006 WL 3246596, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (finding Google is not a 
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“common carrier”); Millan v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 1149937, at *3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 25, 2021) (unpublished) (“Facebook does not satisfy the definition of a 
‘common carrier.’”). 
Second, Section 230’s text demonstrates that its protections are inconsistent 
with common-carrier obligations (in particular nondiscrimination) because it applies 
to, and expressly protects, online services that actively engage in subjective content 
moderation—unlike the kinds of passive conduits that the State and its amici argue 
have been recognized as common carriers.  State Br. 34-35; Babylon Bee Br. 22-24.  
As discussed above, Section 230 encourages online services to moderate content and 
provides protections for those editorial decisions.  Further, Section 230 expressly 
applies (via the definition of “interactive computer services, 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2)) 
to “access software providers,” which are defined in turn as “provider[s] of software 
…, or enabling tools that” “filter, screen, allow, or disallow content,” or “pick, 
choose, analyze, or digest content.”  Id. §230(f)(4).  This statutory text further 
underscores that “interactive computer services” are entities that not only may, but 
are expected to, actively moderate content.  Additionally, the plain text within 
Section 230 establishes that the statute protects content-moderation decisions 
regardless of whether they restrict or block content that “is constitutionally 
protected,” further negating any notion that online platforms are common carriers 
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that must be indiscriminately open to all comers.  Id. §230(c)(2)(A); see also State 
Br. 37-39.   
Third, Section 230’s history and purpose reflect that the statute does the 
opposite of imposing common-carrier obligations on online services that moderate 
content.  As discussed, Section 230 establishes a regulatory framework completely 
at odds with common carriage because it encourages online services to subjectively 
moderate, and therefore differentiate amongst, content.  Supra Part I.  For that 
reason, while Section 230 provides that online services shall not be treated as “the 
publisher” of “information provided by another information content provider,” the 
law simultaneously contemplates that covered services will be more than mere 
conduits for information.  Indeed, common carriage is incompatible with the very 
concept of a social media service and other online platforms protected by Section 
230 because building a social media platform, and fostering a community on that 
platform, necessarily involves editorial judgments and expression by the platform 
operator.  Supra pp.7-10.  That distinguishes social media platforms from the kinds 
of entities the State and its amici contend have traditionally been treated as common 
carriers.  “[Un]like [the] telegraph and telephone lines of the past,” State Br. 37—
which could and did convey communications without regard for their content—
social media platforms simply must differentiate between content to function.  As 
explained, that differentiation both makes social media platforms usable and allows 
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providers to create a community that will attract users—the “social,” in “social 
media.”  Supra pp.7-10. 
Against these clear indications that Section 230 precludes, rather than 
supports, regulating online platforms as common carriers, the State and its amici 
point to the “benefit” Section 230’s liability protections supposedly “confer[]” on 
platforms.  State Br. 38; see also Babylon Bee Br. 25.  For example, defendants’ 
amici characterize Section 230 as part of a “bargain” by which providers “receive 
special government favors in exchange for higher levels of government regulation.”  
Babylon Bee Br. 25-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But Section 230’s 
protections were not extended as part of such an exchange.  Again, Congress granted 
online platforms liability protections “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market … for the Internet and other interactive computer services,” without 
interference by an “army of bureaucrats” and “unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation,” supra pp.5-6—in other words, to encourage them to take the very 
voluntary content-moderation actions S.B. 7072 seeks to prohibit under the guise of 
the common carrier doctrine.  Section 230’s self-regulatory scheme thus represents 
an entirely different kind of “bargain,” through which Congress conferred benefits 
to promote conduct inconsistent with the obligations of common carriers.  As a 
result, the statute only confirms that the common carrier doctrine has no relevance 
here.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining S.B. 
7072.  
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